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This paper focuses on the following U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor market 
practices: in Japanese firms, (i) real decision-making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical 
levels, (ii) employees are multiple-skilled, (iii) human capital accumulation is more firm-specific, (iv) 
labor turnover rate is lower, and (v) continuous process improvement is more prevalent. I present a 
model that addresses interconnections among three key features of work organizations (multiskilling, 
delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses ways in which they are related to labor 
market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among firms concerning their choices of the nature 
of work organizations, and shows that strategic complementarity due to labor market externality can 
yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese 
differences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nature of work organizations and labor market practices differ between the United States and 
Japan in a variety of ways. This paper focuses on the following differences. First, real decision-
making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms than in U.S. 
firms. Aoki (1986, 1988) argues that typical Japanese firms employ horizontal information 
structure, in which workers have substantial decision-making power and determine how to cope 
with irregular events and exceptional operations through horizontal information exchange and 
coordination. Whereas typical U.S. firms employ vertical information structure, in which such 
decision is made at higher hierarchical levels. Second, Japanese firms tend to provide their 
employees with multiple skills for different jobs through on-the-job training and rotation, 
whereas such multiskilling practice is less common in U.S. firms. Third, human capital 
accumulation in Japanese firms is more firm-specific than in U.S. firms. Fourth, Japanese firms 
conduct continuous process improvement more than U.S. firms do. In particular, workers in 
Japanese firms are strongly encouraged to improve their work methods through actively 
participating in quality control (QC) circle activities.
1 Finally, the labor turnover rate is higher in 
the United States than in Japan. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) showed that fifteen-year job 
retention rates were much higher in Japan than in the United States across all age groups.
2 
Several authors previously pointed out interconnections among some of these differences. 
Aoki (1986) analysed trade-offs between the two information structures, where delegated 
workers make quicker but sub-optimal decisions under horizontal information structure. He 
argued that horizontal information structure tends to be more efficient than vertical information 
                                                 
1 Quality control circles in firms are small groups of workers meeting routinely to discuss ways to improve the 
efficiency and quality of their work performances (see, e.g., Hart and Kawasaki, 1999). 
 
2 See Section 2 for details on empirical evidences and case studies corresponding to the five differences described in 
this paragraph.  2
structure if workers have broad knowledge on the whole work process of the firm through 
multiskilling, because such broad knowledge enables workers to make better decisions 
concerning how to cope with irregular and emergent events. Koike (1988) pointed out that the 
provision of multiple skills through rotation is indispensable for inducing workers to improve 
their work methods through quality control (QC) circles activities, because such improvement 
requires that workers have a good understanding of the entire production process. 
  This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the five U.S.-Japanese differences based 
on the multiplicity of equilibria. It presents a model that incorporates the previous insights 
described above, and analyses ways in which several key features of work organizations are 
related to labor market practices. In my model, the difference in labor turnover rate 
endogenously arises due to labor market externality and provides a systematic explanation for 
the U.S.-Japanese differences. The explanation can be viewed as a formalization of the 
conjecture by Aoki (1986), who suggested that the different nature of labor mobility between the 
United States and Japan, interfirm mobility and intrafirm mobility (i.e. rotation) respectively, 
could be closely related to the difference in information structure of the firms between the two 
countries.  
The logic of my argument goes as follows. A firm can provide its early-career employees 
with multiple skills for different jobs by incurring extra costs for their human capital 
accumulation. The employees then obtain a good understanding of the firm’s entire work process 
through acquiring multiple skills. This enables the firm to conduct continuous process 
improvement by inducing its employees to actively participate in quality control (QC) circles 
activities. The firm can also take advantage of its employees’ multiple skills by employing 
horizontal information structure in which real decision-making authority is delegated to lower  3
hierarchical levels, because employees with multiple skills can cope with irregular and emergent 
events quickly and effectively. 
Continuous process improvement involves a number of small changes and modifications, 
which are mostly unobservable from outside the firm.
3 Therefore, if a firm conducts continuous 
process improvement, a degree of specificity is introduced into the firm’s technology.
4 An 
improved technology yields higher productivity only if it is operated by an employee who has 
been trained in the technology and so is familiar with its firm-specificity. Hence, the more 
employees remain in the firm, the higher the benefit of continuous process improvement. When 
other firms also conduct continuous process improvement, the firm’s turnover rate becomes 
lower (and so its retention rate becomes higher) because its employees are less productive in 
other firms. Hence, the benefit of continuous process improvement increases when other firms 
also conduct continuous process improvement. On the other hand, the cost for providing its 
employees with multiple skills, the prerequisite for continuous process improvement, is not 
affected by other firms’ behavior. If the net benefit is positive only if other firms also conduct 
continuous process improvement, two equilibria can exist; all firms conduct continuous process 
improvement in one equilibrium, whereas no firms conduct it in the other equilibrium. The 
former is interpreted as the Japanese equilibrium, and the latter the U.S. equilibrium. 
  In the Japanese equilibrium, each firm provides its employees with multiple skills, which 
enables continuous process improvement. Also, each firm employs horizontal information 
structure, because it is more efficient than vertical information structure if employees have 
multiple skills. Since continuous process improvement leads to a degree of specificity in a firm’s 
                                                 
3 In their survey of 650 U.S. executives, Levin et al. (1987) found that secrecy is perceived to be much more 
effective than patents for preventing duplication of new and improved processes. 
 
4 This has been pointed out by several authors. See Section 3 for details.  4
technology, skills acquired by its employees become less effective in other firms. This lowers the 
turnover rate in the Japanese equilibrium, which, in turn, implies that Japanese firms’ extra 
human capital investments in multiple skills pay off later. In contrast, no firms provide their 
employees with multiple skills in the U.S. equilibrium. This induces each firm to employ vertical 
information structure and adopt the general technology without conducting continuous process 
improvement. Employees accumulate general human capital under the general technology, and 
this raises the turnover rate in the U.S. equilibrium. Concerning equilibrium selection, historical 
events can provide an explanation for why different equilibria have been selected in the United 
States and Japan. I will discuss this point in detail in Section 4.  
  This paper is related to Morita (2001), which focused on U.S.-Japanese differences 
concerning continuous process improvement, turnover rate, and the level and firm-specificity of 
human capital accumulation. The paper showed that connection between continuous process 
improvement and the firm-specificity of training causes multiplicity of equilibria, and explored 
its labor market consequences. One equilibrium is interpreted as the Japanese equilibrium, in 
which all firms conduct continuous process improvement, and as a consequence training 
provided by such a firm becomes less effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate, 
which, in turn, increases firms’ incentives to train employees. In the other equilibrium 
(interpreted as the U.S. equilibrium), training is general, which raises the turnover rate and 
decreases incentives to train. 
  Several other authors have also presented theoretical analyses related to the present 
paper. Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) considered a model in which workers have good ideas 
for technological progress. They showed that employees could induce workers to actively 
participate in technological progress by providing them with multiple skills. By multiskilling,  5
employers can credibly commit to retain workers after technological progress is completed, 
because it is the employers’ own interests ex post to transfer these workers to other jobs. Under 
principal-multi agents frameworks, Itoh (1991, 1992, 1994) and Owan (2001) analyzed agents’ 
incentive issues, which are not addressed in the present paper. Itoh identified, in a variety of 
settings, conditions in which a principal prefers broad task assignments to specialized task 
assignments. Itoh (1994) showed that broad task assignment can be desirable from the incentive 
viewpoint even without technological complementarity among tasks. Owan (2001) showed that a 
principal can benefit from delegating a substantial level of decision-making authority to agents 
and assigning multiple and overlapping tasks to them, because this induces agents to acquire 
higher levels of human capital in order to enhance their bargaining power for their ex post wage 
negotiations.        
  Concerning explanations for cross country differences based on multiple equilibria, 
several authors recently proposed models that provide explanations for the lower turnover rate 
and higher human capital accumulation in Japan (or Germany) than in the United States (see, for 
example, Prendergast, 1989; Chang and Wang, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). These are 
adverse selection models, where informational asymmetry on workers’ abilities plays a central 
role in explaining the differences.  
The present paper is complementary to these earlier papers. The main contribution of the 
present paper is that it addresses interconnections among three key features of work 
organizations (multiskilling, delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses 
ways in which they are related to labor market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among 
firms concerning their choices of the nature of work organizations, and shows that strategic 
complementarity due to labor market externality can yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which  6
provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and 
labor market practices. Furthermore, the explanation is consistent with historical events during 
the Second World War, where government labor regulations for enhancing labor productivity 
during the war were substantially different between the United States and Japan in many aspects. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence and 
case studies concerning the five U.S.-Japanese differences which this paper focuses on. Section 3 
presents a two-period model, where firms simultaneously make decisions concerning the nature 
of their work organizations in period 1 and employees accumulate human capital. Employees can 
switch their employers between period 1 and 2. Section 4 first derives the Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibria of the model, and shows that the result provides an explanation for the five U.S.-




In this section, I present empirical evidence and case studies concerning the five U.S.-Japanese 
differences this paper focuses on. First, real decision-making authority is delegated more to 
lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms than in U.S. firms. Lincoln et al. (1986) identified this 
phenomenon through a careful comparative survey of 55 American and 51 Japanese 
manufacturing plants. They investigated hierarchical levels to which real decision-making 
authority for 37 decision items is assigned, and found that the average level of decision-making 
authority was substantially lower in Japanese plants than in American plants. Similarly, Kagono 
et al. (1985) found, through their large-scale questionnaire survey of U.S. and Japanese firms, 
that strategic corporate decisions are made at or near the top in U.S. firms, whereas the decision  7
making process involves employees at lower hierarchical levels in Japanese firms. See also, e.g., 
Clark (1979) and Cole (1979). 
  Second and third differences, multiskilling and firm-specificity of human capital 
accumulation, concern the nature of human capital accumulation within firms. Koike (1977) 
observed, in his comparative study of Japanese and U.S. manufacturing plants, that workers in 
Japanese plants acquire much wider range of different skills through on-the-job training and 
rotation than workers in U.S. plants do (see also Koike, 1988). Such multiskilling is not limited 
to factory workers but is also prevalent among so called white-collar employees in Japanese 
firms (see, e.g., Kono, 1984; Dertouzos et al., 1989). According to Ito (1992), “In order to have 
workers who possess many different skills, a Japanese company has them invest in various skills 
early in their careers at the company’s expense. These human-capital investments pay off later in 
the worker’s careers” (p. 215). 
Concerning firm-specificity of human capital accumulation, Koike (1977) observed that 
Japanese firms provide their employees with more firm-specific skills by rotating them among 
related jobs (see also Dertouzos et al., 1989; Ito, 1992). Aoki and Okuno-Fujiwara (1996) 
pointed out that, in Japanese factories, operators handle machine troubles and unusual operations 
through their firm-specific skills, whereas in U.S. factories it is usually engineers who handle 
them through general skills. Also, a recent survey of large Japanese firms, conducted by Daiichi 
Insurance Company in 1996, showed that only 34 per cent of employees felt they had 
transferable skills. 
  Fourth, Japanese firms conduct continuous process improvement more than U.S. firms 
do. According to Koike (1988), workers in Japanese firms are encouraged to improve their work 
methods through actively participating in quality control (QC) circle activities, whereas workers  8
in U.S. firms are expected to perform just routine work without making such improvement. The 
M.I.T. commission on Industrial Productivity found, through a number of case studies conducted 
in the late 1980s, that continuous process improvement is a key factor behind Japanese firms’ 
productive edge. For example, the Commission found that, in Japanese steel manufacturing 
companies, engineers were located at each plant to continuously improve manufacturing 
processes through quickly addressing day-to-day operational problems; whereas, in the U.S. 
counterparts, engineers were deployed at a central location and conducted trouble shooting only 
when they were called for (Dertouzos et al., 1989, p. 75-6). 
Finally, the labor turnover rate is higher in the United States than in Japan (see, e.g., 
Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988; Blinder and Krueger, 1996). 
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) analyzed data from the Basic Survey of Employment for Japan and 
data from the Special Labor Force Report for the United States, and found that the fifteen-year 
job retention rates of the male population between the early 1960s and the late 1970s were much 
higher in Japan than in the United States across all age groups. They also found that average job 
tenure of employed males as of 1979 was longer in Japan than in the United States not only for 
large firms but also for small firms.
5 
 
3. THE MODEL 
Consider a two-period economy. Only one good is produced in the economy, and its price is  
normalized to one. There is free entry and firms are risk neutral, and therefore in equilibrium all 
firms earn zero profits. To keep the analysis simple, firms and individuals do not discount the 
future. Labor is the only input, and the production requires two jobs (call them job A and job B). 
                                                 
5 The labor turnover rate in Japan continued to be substantially lower than that in the United States in the 1990s. See, 
e.g., Genda and Rebick (2000).  9
An employee can be assigned to only one of these two jobs in each period. There is a continuum 
of individuals, indexed by j ∈  [0, N] (N > 0). In each period, labor supply is perfectly inelastic 
and fixed at one unit for each individual. Individuals display no disutility of effort. Also, assume 
that individuals are either risk neutral or averse. 
Output is realized at the end of each period. Firm i’s output in period t is given by 
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(Bit) means individual j is employed by firm i and assigned to job A (B) in period t, µ  denotes 




it ρ ρ  denotes individual j’s productivity when she is employed 




it ρ ρ  will be given 
below. 
At the beginning of period 1, each individual has the same general human capital and 
looks identical to the firms. Firms simultaneously make first period wage offers ( i w ˆ > 0, i = 1, 2, 
…) to the individuals. Each individual offers herself for employment to the firm that offers the  
highest wage. If several firms offer the same wage, individuals split themselves equally among 
the firms.
6  
  In period 1, after having hired individuals but prior to producing any output, all the firms 
that have hired individuals simultaneously make the following three decisions. Once the 
decisions are made, they become public knowledge. First, the firms decide whether they provide 
their employees with a single skill (denoted S) or multiple skills (denoted M). Let ki (= S or M) 
denote firm i’s choice. If ki = S, a half of firm i’s employees acquire a skill for Job A, and the 
                                                 
6 To ensure that at least three firms operate in equilibrium, I assume that the maximum number of employees a 
single firm can hire is D < N/2. See the Appendix for details.  10
other half acquire a skill for job B. If ki = M, all the employees acquire both skills.  Let cS (> 0) 
denote a cost (per employee) for a firm to provide a single skill, and cM (>cS) for multiple skills. 
Let c ≡  cM – cS (> 0), which is the extra cost for providing multiple skills. Second, they choose 
either vertical information structure (denoted V) or horizontal information structure (denoted H). 
Let ri (= V or H) denote firm i’s choice. Third, they decide whether or not to conduct continuous 
process improvement; each firm chooses either general technology (denoted G) or improved 
technology (denoted I). Let ti (= G or I) denote firm i’s choice.  
In the first period of a firm’s operation, each employee’s productivity is fixed at d (> 0). 
While productivity in the second period is affected by choices made in the first period by firms 
that hired individuals.
7 Recall that each firm i’s choices are denoted by (ki, ri, ti), where ki = S 
(provision of a single skill) or M (multiple skills), ri = V (vertical information structure) or H 
(horizontal information structure), and ti = G (general technology) or I (improved technology).  
In the second period of firm u’s operation, individual j’s productivity in job A (B) is given by 
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where auj is individual j’s match quality with firm u. Here, x(ti, tu, z) (z = 0 or 1) captures the 
productivity of an individual who acquired skills in firm i and is in firm u in period 2, where z = 
                                                 
7 In this specification, a firm that enters in period 2 has a fixed productivity per employee of d even if it employs 
workers who have already acquired skills in other firms. Implicitly, I am assuming that the higher productivity in a 
firm’s second period of operation is partly due to knowledge acquired by a firm during its first period of operation. 
  11
0 means that she has stayed with the same employer, and z = 1 means that she has changed her 
employer. Namely, i = u if z = 0 and i ≠  u if z = 1. 
Assume H(M) > V(M) > V(S) > H(S) > 0. That is, if an employee has multiple skills, her 
productivity is higher under horizontal information structure than vertical information structure, 
whereas her productivity is higher under vertical information structure if she has just a single 
skill. This assumption reflects the point made by Aoki (1986), who argued that horizontal 
information structure tends to be more efficient than vertical information structure if workers 
have broad knowledge on the whole work process of the firm through multiskilling, because 
such broad knowledge enables workers to make better decisions concerning how to cope with 
irregular and emergent events. Also assume that each firm i can choose ti = I (improved 
technology) only if it chooses ki = M (multiple skills). This assumption reflects Koike (1988)’s 
observation that the provision of multiple skills is indispensable for inducing workers to improve 
their work methods through quality control (QC) circles activities, because such improvement 
requires that workers have a good understanding of the entire production process.
8   
If a firm conducts continuous process improvement, the technology is improved but a 
degree of specificity is introduced. This is because, in general, continuous process improvement 
involves a number of small changes and modifications, which lead to highly firm-specific 
technologies. Doeringer and Piore (1971) made exactly this point. ‘Line supervision, and 
sometimes operatives and maintenance crews as well, are forever modifying equipment in order 
                                                 
8 To illustrate the importance of understanding the entire production process, Koike described an example from an 
automated workshop for wrapping sausages. The workers in the workshop found that, in order to reduce the defect 
rate for wrapping, the heating treatment of the sausages should be adjusted at the earlier processing stages.  12
to improve its efficiency. Such changes accumulate quickly and can produce considerable 
movement toward specificity’ (p. 17).
9  
Technology and skill acquisition are closely related. I assume that, if an individual 
acquires a skill under the general technology, her skill is equally valuable at any firm that 
employs the general technology; while, if an individual acquires a skill under an improved 
technology, her skill is specific to this firm to a certain degree. I assume that, holding everything 
else constant, an improved technology yields higher second period productivity than the general 
technology only if it is operated by an individual who is familiar with its firm-specificity. 
Otherwise, it yields less productivity than the general technology.
10  
The two assumptions above imply the following properties for x(⋅ , ⋅ , ⋅ ). First, x(I, I, 0) 
takes the highest value among all combinations of x(ti, tu, z). Namely, holding everything else 
constant, an individual’s second period productivity is the highest if she acquired skills under a 
firm’s improved technology and operates it in period 2. Second, x(ti, tu, 1) ≤  x(G, G, 0) for all 
combinations of ti and tu, where the weak inequality holds with equality if and only if ti = tu = G. 
This says two things. First, suppose that an individual operates the general technology in period 
2. If an individual acquired a skill under the general technology in period 1, her productivity is 
unaffected whether or not she changed her employers. On the other hand, if she acquired a skill 
under an improved technology, holding everything else constant, her period 2 productivity 
becomes lower due to firm-specificity of her skill. Second, if a firm’s improved technology is 
                                                 
9 Also, Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) pointed out, ‘Most world class Germany and Japanese manufacturing 
companies have large, well-staffed, very active machine shops. Much of the success of these companies is a result of 
the proprietary production processes that are incubated in these shops and therefore unavailable to their competitors’ 
(p. 381). 
 
10 In other words, through continuous process improvement, changes and modifications are made to machines in the 
production process such that, if the machines are operated optimally then productivity increases, but if the machines 
are operated as if they were general technology machines then productivity falls. 
  13
operated by an individual who has not acquired skills under the technology and hence is not 
familiar with its firm-specificity, holding everything else constant, the improved technology 
yields less productivity than the general technology. 
Individual j has match qualities aj ≡  (a1j, a2j, … , aγ j) with firm 1, 2, ..., γ  respectively, 
where γ  denotes the number of firms that offer second period wages and 0 ≤  aij ≤  1. The match 
qualities are independently and identically distributed across firms and individuals according to a 
uniform distribution between 0 and 1. This is common knowledge. At the beginning of period 1, 
aj is unknown to individual j and the firms. If an individual is employed by firm i in period 1, the 
match quality aij becomes known to the individual and firm i at the end of period 1.
11 Match 
quality in my model is an experience good as in Jovanovic (1979). 
At the beginning of period 2, firms simultaneously make second period wage offers. All 
firms that operated in period 1 make wage offers to all individuals. Firms that did not operate in 
period 1 can also make wage offers. Firm i’s wage offer to another firm’s period 1 employees is 
denoted w
iu (i ≠  u). Note that, when a firm makes wage offers to its own period 1 employees, it 
knows their match qualities with itself. Hence, the wage offers can be different across 
individuals. wj
ii denotes firm i’s wage offer to its own period 1 employee, individual j. I assume 
that wage offers are public knowledge. Given the wage offers, each individual takes the highest 
one. If more than one firm offers the highest wage, the employee stays with her current employer 
if it offered the highest wage, and randomly chooses one of the highest offers otherwise. 
                                                 
11 One way to justify the learning of match qualities is by assuming that the match qualities affect first period 
productivities, and each employer learns her first period employees’ match qualities by observing their 
productivities. All the results of the paper follow under this assumption if each individual’s expected first period 
productivity is d. 
  Whether or not other firms learn the match quality aij does not affect the results, because an individual’s 
match qualities are independently distributed across firms. If the match qualities were correlated across firms and the 
realization of match quality were known only to the individual and her current employer, adverse selection would 
occur as in Greenwald (1986). Since the focus of this paper is on interconnections among the three key features of 
work organizations and its labor market consequences, I do not incorporate adverse selection into my model.  14
I summarize the interaction among the firms and the individuals as follows. 
(Stage 1) Firms simultaneously make first period wage offers ( i w ˆ > 0, i = 1, 2, …) to the 
individuals. Each individual offers herself for employment to the firm that offers her the highest 
wage. If several firms offer the same wage, individuals split themselves equally among the firms. 
The maximum number of employees a single firm can hire is D. 
(Stage 2) Firms that hired a strictly positive number of individuals simultaneously make the 
following three decisions: each firm i chooses (ki, ri, ti), where ki = S (provision of a single skill) 
or M (multiple skills), ri = V (vertical information structure) or H (horizontal information 
structure), and ti = G (general technology) or I (improved technology).   
(Stage 3) The match quality aij becomes known to individual j and her period 1 employer firm i. 
Then, each firm makes its second period wage offers to other firms’ period 1 employees; firm i 
chooses w
iu (> 0, i ≠  u). At the same time, each firm makes its second period wage offers to its 
own period 1 employees (if any); firm i chooses wj
ii (> 0) for all j employed by firm i in period 1. 
Firms that did not operate in period 1 can also make second period wage offers. 
(Stage 4) Given the second period wage offers, each individual takes the highest one. If more 
than one firm offers the highest wage, the employee stays with her current employer if it offered 




In this section, I consider Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) in pure strategies of the 
model described above. I define MHI-equilibrium to be an SPNE outcome where each firm 
provides its employees with multiple skills (M), chooses horizontal information structure (H),  15
and employs an improved technology (I). Whereas in SVG-equilibrium each firm provides its 
employees with a single skill (S), chooses vertical information structure (V), and adopts the 
general technology (G). The central result is presented in Proposition 1, which states that there 
exist parameterizations under which the game has both an MHI-equilibrium and an SVG-
equilibrium and there are no other symmetric equilibrium outcomes. Note, all proofs except 
Lemma 1 are in the Appendix. 
  For the MHI-equilibrium to exist, each firm i’s optimal choice concerning skill provision, 
information structure and technology must be (ki, ri, ti) = (M, H, I) given all other firms choose 
(M, H, I). Similarly, each firm i’s optimal choice must be (ki, ri, ti) = (S, V, G) given all other 
firms choose (S, V, G) for the SVG-equilibrium to exist. Lemma 1 analyses stage 3 subgames in 
which all firms except firm i have made the same choice denoted (K, R, T) where K = S or M, R 
= V or H, and T = G or I, and identifies equilibrium second-period wage offers to firm i’s first 
period employees. 
 
Lemma 1:  Suppose that at least three firms operate in period 1, and that firm i chose (ki, ri, ti) 
and all other firms chose (ku, ru, tu) = (K, R, T) at stage 2. The SPNE outcome of the subsequent 
subgame is characterized by the following. 
  w
ui ≤  (1/2)[(1/2)x(ti, T, 1)R(ki) + d] ≡  w* for all u ≠  i,                   (1) 
              where the weak inequality holds with equality for at least two firms. 
  w j
ii =  ,





a k r t t x k R T t x a if w i i i i i i ij
η
    (2) 
              for all j employed by firm i in period 1, where 0 ≤  η  < w*. 
  16
Suppose individual j was employed by firm i in period 1. Since her match quality with 
other firms is unknown, her period 2 expected productivity in firm u (≠  i) (provided that she is 
assigned to a job for which she has acquired a skill) is E(auj)x(ti, tu, 1)ru(ki) + d = (1/2)x(ti, T, 
1)R(ki) + d if firm u operated in period 1. Note that the expected productivity is the same value 
across all other firms that operated in period 1 and less than that value in firms that did not 
operate in period 1, and that firm u’s output in period t is given by Yut = Min[Put
A, Put
B].  Then, 
Bertrand wage competition bids up the wage until it equals (1/2)[(1/2)x(ti, T, 1)R(ki) + d] ≡  w*. 
This establishes (1). Firm i can retain individual j by offering wj
ii = w*. Since firm i knows its 
employees’ match qualities with itself when it makes period 2 wage offers, it retains individual j 
if (1/2)[aijx(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki)+d] – w* ≥  0 ⇔  aij ≥  x(ti, T, 1)R(ki)/(2x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki)) ≡  ã.
12 This 
establishes (2). Note that the turnover rate of firm i’s first period employees is determined by the 
cut-off match quality ã. The second period wage offers and the turnover rate are determined by 
choices made by firms at stage 2 concerning skill provision, information structure and 
technology. I will now present the central result in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1:  For any given parameter values, there exist values c' (> 0) and c'' (> 0) such that, 
if c' < c < c'', the game has both an MHI-equilibrium and an SVG-equilibrium and no other 
symmetric equilibria. The MHI-equilibrium Pareto dominates the SVG-equilibrium if c' < c < c''. 
Also, the MHI-equilibrium exhibits a lower turnover rate than the SVG-equilibrium. There exist 
parameterizations for which c' < c''.
13  
                                                 
12 This property holds whether ki is S or M, because, if ki = S, a half of firm i’s period 1 employees acquire a skill 
for job A and the other half acquire a skill for job B. 
 
13 There do not exist asymmetric equilibria in which at least two firms choose the same combination of skill 
provision (S or M), information structure (V or H), and technology (G or I). However, I was unable to rule out the 
possibility of asymmetric equilibria in which one firm chooses a different combination from all other firms.  17
It is well known that strategic complementarity can cause multiple equilibria.
14 Cooper 
and John (1988) showed that strategic complementarity is necessary for multiple symmetric 
Nash equilibria. The logic is as follows.
15 Consider a game where n agents choose actions, either 
the low action (L) or the high action (H), simultaneously and non-cooperatively to maximize 
their payoffs. Suppose there exist two symmetric equilibria, the low action equilibrium and the 
high action equilibrium. Then an agent’s optimal strategy is L when all other agents choose L. 
Namely the agent’s incremental payoff from choosing H over L is negative when all other agents 
choose L. On the other hand, if all other agents choose H, the agent will increase her payoff by 
choosing H over L. Namely the incremental payoff is positive in this case. This is a strategic 
complementarity; an agent’s marginal (incremental) return increases when all other agents 
increase their actions (choose H over L). 
In my model, strategic complementarity arises endogenously due to labor market 
externality. Suppose that firm i provides its employees with multiple skills in period 1. The firm 
must incur an extra cost, c (> 0) per employee, for providing multiple skills. In return, since 
multiskilling enables continuous process improvement, firm i can choose an improved 
technology (I), which enhances period 2 productivity of its retained employees. Firm i can 
further increase their productivity by choosing horizontal information structure (H). These are 
the benefits of multiskilling. Since a degree of specificity is introduced into a firm’s technology 
if an improved technology is chosen, firm i’s period 1 employees become less productive in 
other firms if other firms also choose improved technologies. This lowers firm i’s turnover rate, 
and so enhances its marginal (incremental) benefit from choosing multiskilling because it can 
                                                 
14 A game exhibits strategic complementarity if the marginal returns to increasing one’s strategy rise with increase in 
the competitors’ strategies (see Bulow et al. ,1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
 
15 Cooper and John considered the case where action is a continuous variable, whereas action is a discrete variable in 
the following argument.  18
retain more employees who are familiar with its own improved technology. That is, firm i’s 
marginal benefit of choosing (M, H, I) strategy over (S, V, G) strategy increases, due to labor 
market externality, if all other firms also choose (M, H, I) strategy. This is the strategic 
complementarity in my model.  
On the other hand, the extra cost for providing multiple skills is not affected by other 
firms’ choices. Hence, if the extra cost for multiskilling is in an intermediate range, the net 
benefit of choosing (M, H, I) strategy can be positive only if other firms also choose the same 
strategy. Then the game has both an MHI-equilibrium and an SVG-equilibrium, where the 
former Pareto dominates the latter. To understand the welfare comparison result, consider firm i 
in the SVG-equilibrium. Firm i’s second-period profit increases if all other firms choose  
(M, H, I) strategy over (S, V, G) strategy. This is because firm i’s first-period employees become 
less effective in other firms in the second period if all other firms choose (M, H, I) strategy, 
which in turn means that firm i can retain its employees at a lower second-period wage. But, if 
all other firms choose (M, H, I) strategy, firm i can further increase its second-period profit by 
choosing (M, H, I) strategy because the game has the MHI-equilibrium as well. Noting that in 
equilibrium all firms earn zero profit due to free entry, this implies that total wages are higher in 
the MHI-equilibrium than in the SVG-equilibrium, and so the former Pareto dominates the latter. 
By interpreting the MHI-equilibrium to be Japanese equilibrium and the SVG-
equilibrium to be U.S. equilibrium, the model provides an explanation for the five U.S.-Japanese 
differences in work organizations and labor market practices. In the Japanese equilibrium, all 
firms provide their employees with multiple skills, and take advantage of the multiple skills by 
conducting continuous process improvement and employing horizontal information structure. A 
degree of specificity is introduced into each firm’s improved technology, which results in firm- 19
specificity in human capital and thus lowers the turnover rate. Due to the low turnover rate, each 
firm’s extra investment in multiskilling pays off later. In contrast, in the U.S. equilibrium all 
firms provide their employees with a single skill. This induces each firm to employ vertical 
information structure and adopt the general technology, which results in general human capital 
and higher turnover rate. The extra investment in multiple skills does not pay off due to the high 
turnover rate.  
This explanation can be viewed as a formalization of the conjecture by Aoki (1986), who 
suggested that the different nature of labor mobility between the United States and Japan, 
interfirm mobility and intrafirm mobility (i.e. rotation) respectively, could be closely related to 
the difference in information structure of the firms between the two countries. He wrote, “I 
simply suggest that there may be a close connection between labor market characteristics and 
information systematic characteristics of the firm from a comparative perspective” (Aoki, 1986, 
p. 981). In my model, the difference in labor turnover rate endogenously arises due to labor 
market externality and provides a systematic explanation for U.S.-Japanese differences in several 
key features of work organizations. 
Concerning equilibrium selection, historical events during the Second World War can 
provide an explanation for why different equilibria have been selected in the United States and 
Japan. Moriguchi (2000) points out that government labor regulations for enhancing labor 
productivity during the war were substantially different between the United States and Japan in 
many aspects. The U.S. government promoted job simplification and standardization, and 
created industry-wide training programs such as the Training Within Industry program. In 
contrast, the Japanese government encouraged corporate training programs and the development 
of workers with multiple and firm-specific skills. The Skilled Employee Training Ordinance of  20
1939 required employers to provide three-year training programs within a company in order to 
foster “skilled mainstay workers (chuken jukuren-ko), which were defined as those who were 
multi-skilled and possessed a considerable technical ability to judge and perform tasks on the 
shop floor without consulting an instructor.
16  
In my framework, one can interpret that this difference in governmental policies during 
the war led the United States to choose the SVG-equilibrium while Japan to choose the MHI-
equilibrium in the postwar period. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the average 
turnover rate of manufacturing workers in the U.S. was comparable to that in Japan before the 
Second World War, in contrast to the postwar period during which the two numbers exhibited a 
significant difference (Moriguchi, 2000). 
In the next proposition, I consider parameterizations for which c' < c'', but where the extra 
cost for providing multiple skills is not in the intermediate range (namely c' < c < c'' does not 
hold). 
 
Proposition 2:  Let c' and c'' be as in Proposition 1. (i) The MHI-equilibrium is the unique 
symmetric SPNE outcome if c < c'. (ii) The SVG-equilibrium is the unique symmetric SPNE 
outcome if c > c''. 
 
  If the extra cost for multiskilling is low, the net benefit of choosing (M, H, I) strategy 
becomes positive even if other firms choose the general technology (G) over an improved 
technology (I). The game does not have the SVG-equilibrium in this case. If the extra cost is 
                                                 
16 Moriguchi (2000) argues that wartime labor regulation in the U.S. and Japan tended to reinforce the employment 
practices that had been gradually developed in large private firms throughout the 1930s, and diffuse these practices 
to the rest of the economy.   21
high, the net benefit of choosing (M, H, I) strategy becomes negative even if other firms choose 
the same strategy. The game does not have the MHI-equilibrium in this case. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has focused on the five U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and labor 
market practices; namely, real decision-making authority is delegated more to lower hierarchical 
levels in Japanese firms, Japanese firms tend to provide their employees with multiple skills, 
human capital accumulation is more firm-specific in Japanese firms, Japanese labor turnover rate 
is lower, and Japanese firms conduct continuous process improvement more than U.S. firms do.  
I have presented a model that provides an explanation for these differences based on the 
multiplicity of equilibria, where strategic complementarity concerning choice of work 
organizations arises endogenously due to labor market externality. In the Japanese equilibrium, 
each firm provides its employees with multiple skills. This enables continuous process 
improvement, because employees obtain a good understanding of the firm’s entire work process 
through acquiring multiple skills. Also, each firm employs horizontal information structure, in 
which multiple-skilled employees have substantial decision-making authority and determine how 
to cope with irregular and emergent events. Since continuous process improvement leads to a 
degree of specificity in a firm’s technology, skills acquired by its employees become less 
effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate in the Japanese equilibrium, which, in turn, 
implies that Japanese firms’ extra human capital investments for providing multiple skills pay off 
later. In contrast, no firms provide their employees with multiple skills in the U.S. equilibrium. 
This induces each firm to employ vertical information structure and adopt the general  22
technology. Employees accumulate general human capital under the general technology, and this 
raises the turnover rate in the U.S. equilibrium.  
This paper is related to Morita (2001), which showed that connection between continuous 
process improvement and the firm-specificity of training causes multiplicity of equilibria, and 
explored its labor market consequences. Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) presented a model in 
which multiskilling serves as employers’ commitment device for inducing their employees to 
actively participate in technological progress. Under principal-multi agents frameworks, Itoh 
(1991, 1992, 1994) and Owan (2001) analyzed agents’ incentive issues, which have not been 
addressed in the present paper. Concerning explanations for cross country differences based on 
multiple equilibria, several authors recently proposed models that provide explanations for the 
lower turnover rate and higher human capital accumulation in Japan (or Germany) than in the 
United States (see, for example, Prendergast, 1989; Chang and Wang, 1995; Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1998), where  informational asymmetry on workers’ abilities causes multiple equilibria.  
This paper makes a contribution complementary to them. The main contribution of the 
present paper is that it addresses interconnections among three key features of work 
organizations (multiskilling, delegation, and continuous process improvement), and analyses 
ways in which they are related to labor market practices. It analyses strategic interactions among 
firms concerning their choices of the nature of work organizations, and shows that strategic 
complementarity due to labor market externality can yield the multiplicity of equilibria, which 
provides a systematic explanation for the U.S.-Japanese differences in work organizations and 
labor market practices. Furthermore, concerning equilibrium selection, historical events during 
the Second World War can provide an explanation for why different equilibria have been 
selected in the United States and Japan in the post war period.  23
Although this paper focused on an explanation for U.S.-Japanese differences based on 
multiplicity of equilibria, my model can be extended so that it yields explanations based on 
exogenous factors such as differences in the effectiveness of research and development (R&D).  
Mansfield (1988) found, in his comparative study of industrial R&D in Japan and the United 
States, that the rate of return from industrial basic research was higher in the United States than 
in Japan. This difference implies that U.S. firms tend to invest in basic research more than 
Japanese firms do, where basic research aims at inventing entirely new products and processes. 
This in turn implies that the return of continuous process improvement in U.S. firms tends to be 
lower than in Japanese firms, because such an improvement is built upon currently available 
technology and production processes which could become obsolete if entirely new technology 
and production processes are invented. My theoretical framework would then suggest that, if the 
extra cost for providing multiple skills is in an intermediate range, multiskilling is beneficial only 
for Japanese firms, and this would result in the set of U.S.-Japanese differences that this paper 
focused on. In a future research, I plan to extend the model in such directions.
17 
 
                                                 
17 I would like to thank Bill Schworm for suggesting this idea.   24
APPENDIX 
The process in which firms employ individuals in period 1 is as follows. Suppose n’ firms offer 
the highest wage. Since individuals split themselves equally among the firms,  N/n’ individuals 
offer themselves for employment to each firm. If  N/n’ ≤  D, each firm employs N/n’ individuals 
and the process ends. If N/n’ > D, each firm employs D individuals, and the remaining (N-n’D) 
individuals offer themselves to the firm(s) that offer the second highest wage. The process 
continues until all the individuals are employed. In any equilibrium where each firm makes the 
same choice at stage 2, all firms that hire some individuals offer the same first period wage due 
to symmetry and zero profit condition. 
Note that all individuals are employed in any Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). 
To see this, suppose some individuals are not employed. Then, a firm has an incentive to offer a 
wage w (∈ (0, d)), employ them, and earn a strictly positive profit. Therefore, D < N/2 ensures 
that at least three firms operate in any equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:   
I will first establish two more lemmas. 
Lemma 2:  Suppose that, at stage 1, firm i offered  i w ˆ (> 0) and hired n (> 0) individuals and at 
least two other firms hired a positive measure of individuals. Suppose also that firm i chose (ki, 
ri, ti) and all other firms chose (ku, ru, tu) = (K, R, T) (where K = S or M, R = V or H, T = G or I) 
at stage 2. Firm i’s profit in the SPNE of the subsequent stage 3 subgame, denoted π i[(ki, ri, ti), 
(K, R, T)], is as follows. 
π i[(ki, ri, ti), (K, R, T)] = n{(1/2)[φ (ki, ri, ti, R, T) + d + ((N – n)/n)λ (ri, ti, K, R, T)] – χ  –  i w ˆ }, 
where 
(i) φ (ki, ri, ti, R, T) ≡  {1/[2x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki)]}[x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki) – (1/2)x(ti, T, 1)R(ki)]
2 if ã ≤  1  
(ã ≡  x(ti, T, 1)R(ki)/(2x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki))) and 0 otherwise, 
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      where ϕ  ≡  (1/16)[x(T, ti, 1)ri(K)]
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Proof of Lemma 2: 
First I will show that firm i’s period 2 profit from retained employees is (n/2)φ (ki, ri, ti, R, 
T). By Lemma 1, firm i retains individual j if aij ≥  x(ti, T, 1)R(ki)/(2x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki)) ≡  ã by 
offering wj
ii = w*. Then, firm i’s period 2 profit from retained employees is 0 if ã > 1. Otherwise, 
applying the law of large numbers, the profit is given by 
n(1 – ã){(1/2)[E[aij| aij ≥  ã]x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki)+d] – w*} 
= (n/2){1/[2x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki)]}[x(ti, ti, 0)ri(ki) – (1/2)x(ti, T, 1)R(ki)]
2.                            (A1)  
Next I will show that firm i’s period 2 profit from employees trained by other firms, 
denoted π i2
O,  is (1/2)(N- n)λ (ri, ti, K, R, T). First note that all N individuals are employed in 
period 1. Without loss of generality, let i = 1 and assume that two other firms (call them firm 2 
and 3) employed a positive measure of individuals in period 1. If individual j accumulated her 
skill in firm 2, her period 2 expected productivity in firm 1 (provided that she is assigned to a job 
for which she has acquired a skill) in period 1 is (1/2)x(T, t1, 1)r1(K) + d and that in firm 3 is 
(1/2)x(T, T, 1)R(K) + d. Hence, π 12
O = 0 if x(T, t1, 1)r1(K) < x(T, T, 1)R(K). Assume x(T, t1, 
1)r1(K) > x(T, T, 1)R(K) in what follows, and ignore firm 3 for now. Suppose firm 1 offers w
12(≥  
0) to firm 2 trained individuals. Then, noting that firm 2’s output in period t is given by Y2t = 
Min[P2t
A, P2t
B], firm 2 retains individual j if and only if  
(1/2)[a2jx(T, T, 0)R(K) + d] ≥  w
12 ⇔  a2j ≥  (2w
12 – d)/(x(T, T, 0)R(K)). 
Then, the measure of firm 2 trained individuals who move to firm 1 is n2(2w
12 –d)/(x(T, T, 
0)R(K)), where n2 denotes the measure of firm 2’s period 1 employees. Then firm 1’s period 2 
profit from firm 2 trained individuals is  
n2[(2w
12-d)/(x(T, T, 0)R(K))](1/2)[(1/2)x(T, t1, 1)r1(K) – (2w
12-d)].                   (A2) 
The optimal choice of w
12 is w* = (1/2)[(1/4)x(T, t1, 1)r1(K) + d].  
Now, take the existence of firm 3 into account. Individual j’s period 2 expected 
productivity in firm 3 is (1/2)x(T, T, 1)R(K) + d. Hence, for firm 1 to hire her, w
12 ≥  
(1/2)[(1/2)x(T, T, 1)R(K) + d] must hold. Note that w* ≥  (1/2)[(1/2)x(T, T, 1)R(K) + d] ⇔  x(T,  26
t1, 1)r1(K) ≥  2x(T, T, 1)R(K). If x(T, t1, 1)r1(K) ≥  2x(T, T, 1)R(K), the optimal wage offer 
(denoted w
12*) is w*. Plug this in (A2) and obtain (n2/2)(1/16)[x(T, t1, 1)r1(K)]
2/[x(T, T, 
0)R(K)], as firm 1’s period 2 profit from firm 2 trained individuals. The same argument for 
individuals trained by firm 3. Hence,  
π 12
O = (1/2)(N-n)ϕ ,                                                         (A3) 
where ϕ  ≡  (1/16)[x(T, ti, 1)ri(K)]
2/[x(T, T, 0)R(K)]. Similarly, if 2x(T, T, 1)R(K) > x(T, t1, 
1)r1(K) > x(T, T, 1)R(K), then w
12* = (1/2)[(1/2)x(T, T, 1)R(K) + d], and  
π 12
O = (1/2)(N-n)θ ,                           (A4) 
where θ   ≡  (1/4)[x(T, ti, 1)ri(K) – x(T, T, 1)R(K)][x(T, T, 1)/x(T, T, 0)]. Then, (A1), (A3) and 
(A4) imply the result.   Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 3:  The MHI-equilibrium and the SVG-equilibrium are only candidates for symmetric 
SPNE outcome. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Given after the proof of Proposition 1. 
 
Let m  be the minimum integer which satisfies N/(m -1) < D. I will first identify a 
necessary condition for the game to have both an MHI-equilibrium and an SGV-equilibrium 
where m (∈  [ m m, ]) firms operate in period 1, and then show that the condition is also 
sufficient. In what follows, define π i[(ki, ri, ti), (K, R, T)] as in Lemma 2. 
Suppose that, at stage 1, firm i offered  i w ˆ (> 0) and hired n (> 0) individuals and at least 
two other firms hired a positive measure of individuals. Since V(S) > H(S), we have  
φ (S, V, G, V, G) 
= (1/2)[1 – x(G, G, 1)V(S)/(2x(G, G, 0)V(S))][x(G, G, 0)V(S) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)V(S)] 
> (1/2)[1 – x(G, G, 1)V(S)/(2x(G, G, 0)H(S))][x(G, G, 0)H(S) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)V(S)] 
= φ (S, H, G, V, G). 
This implies π i[(S, H, G), (S, V, G)] < π i[(S, V, G), (S, V, G)], and so firm i’s optimal strategy 
cannot be (ki, ri, ti) = (S, H, G) given all other firms choose (ku, ru, tu) = (S, V, G). Suppose firm i 
chooses ki = M given all other firms choose (ku, ru, tu) = (S, V, G), and let rM (= V or H) and tM 
(= G or I) denote firm i’s corresponding optimal choice for ri and ti respectively. Then, if the  27
SVG-equilibrium exists, π i[(S, V, G), (S, V, G)] > π i[(M, rM, tM), (S, V, G)] holds. This is 
equivalent to 
    c > c', where c' ≡  (1/2)[φ (M, rM, tM, V, G) – φ (S, V, G, V, G)]. 
  Next consider a necessary condition for the MHI-equilibrium to exist. Suppose that, at 
stage 1, firm i offered  i w ˆ (> 0) and hired n (> 0) individuals and at least two other firms hired a 
positive measure of individuals. I establish the following claim: 
 
Claim 1: (i) Given all other firms choose (ku, ru, tu) = (M, H, I), firm i’s optimal choice cannot be 
(ki, ri, ti) = (M, V, I). (ii) π i[(M, V, G), (M, H, I)] < π i[(M, H, G), (M, H, I)]. 
Proof of Claim 1: 
(i)  Since H(M) > V(M), we have   
(2/n){π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] – π i[(M, V, I), (M, H, I)]} 
≥  (1/2)[1 – x(I, I, 1)H(M)/(2x(I, I, 0)H(M))][x(I, I, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(I, I, 1)H(M)] 
    – (1/2)[1 – x(I, I, 1)H(M)/(2x(I, I, 0)V(M))][x(I, I, 0)V(M) – (1/2)x(I, I, 1)H(M)] 
> 0. 
Hence π i[(M, V, I), (M, H, I)] < π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)], which implies the result. 
(ii) (2/n){π i[(M, H, G), (M, H, I)] – π i[(M, V, G), (M, H, I)]} 
> φ (M, H, G, H, I) – φ (M, V, G, H, I)  
         (Note, H(M) > V(M) implies λ (H, G, M, H, I) > λ (V, G, M, H, I).) 
≥  (1/2)[1 – x(G, I, 1)H(M)/(2x(G, G, 0)H(M))][x(G, G, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(G, I, 1)H(M)] 
    – (1/2)[1 – x(G, I, 1)H(M)/(2x(G, G, 0)V(M))][x(G, G, 0)V(M) – (1/2)x(G, I, 1)H(M)] 
> 0. This implies the result. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Suppose that an MHI-equilibrium exists where m (∈  [ m m, ]) firms operate in period 1. 
In the equilibrium, all m firms offer the same period 1 wage at stage 1 and choose (M, H, I). 
There is no incentive for each of the m firms to choose a set of strategies different from (M, H, I) 
at stage 2. Also, there is no incentive for another firm to offer the same period 1 wage and 
choose a set of strategies different from (M, H, I) at stage 2. This and Claim 1 together imply that  28
the following two conditions hold (let rS denote firm i’s optimal choice for ri when firm i chooses 
ki = S (and so ti = G) and all other firms choose (ku, ru, tu) = (M, H, I)): 
First, “π i[(S, rS, G), (M, H, I)] < π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] when n = N/(m + 1)”. This condition is 
equivalent to 
c <  " ~ c (m+1), 
where  " ~ c (γ ) ≡  (1/2)[φ (M, H, I, H, I) – φ (S, rS, G, H, I) – (γ  – 1)λ (rS, G, M, H, I)]. 
Second, “π i[(M, H, G), (M, H, I)] < π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] when n = N/(m + 1)”. This condition 
is equivalent to 
  m < M, where M ≡  {φ (M, H, I, H, I) – φ (M, H, G, H, I) }/λ (H, G, M, H, I). 
Then, “c' < c <  " ~ c (m +1) and m < M” is a necessary condition for the game to have both an 
MHI-equilibrium and an SVG-equilibrium where m (∈  [ m m, ]) firms operate. The necessary 
condition is equivalent to 
  c' < c < c'', where c'' ≡   .
'
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                                                       (A5)                                
  
  Next, I will show that (A5) is also sufficient. Suppose (A5) holds. Pick any c that satisfies 
(A5) and define m to be the maximum integer such that “c' < c <  " ~ c (m +1) and m < M” holds. 
Define wM and wS as follows. 
 w M ≡  (1/2)[φ (M, H, I, H, I) +d] – cM, 
 w S  ≡  (1/2)[φ (S, G, V, G, V) +d] – cS. 
Note, π i[(S, rS, G), (M, H, I)] ≤  π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] 
⇔  (N – n)/n ≤  [φ (M, H, I, H, I) – φ (S, rS, G, H, I) – 2c]/λ (rS, G, M, H, I),                (A6) 
and    π i[(M, H, G), (M, H, I)] ≤  π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] 
⇔  (N – n)/n ≤  [φ (M, H, I, H, I) – φ (M, H, G, H, I)]/λ (H, G, M, H, I).                      (A7) 
Let n* be the maximum real number such that both (A6) and (A7) hold. We have π i[(M, H, G), 
(M, H, I)] ≤  π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] and π i[(S, rS, G), (M, H, I)] ≤  π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] for all n 
≥  n* because (N – n)/n is decreasing in n. Note that N/(m +1) ≥  n* by the definition of m . Let n 
denote the minimum measure of individuals that a firm hired at stage 1. Consider Strategy M and 
Strategy S defined as follows.  29
Strategy M: At stage 1, m (∈  [ m m, ]) firms make the maximum wage offer  i w ˆ = wM. At 
stage 2, all firms choose (M, H, I) if n≥  n* and choose (S, V, G) otherwise. 
Strategy S: At stage 1, m (∈  [ m m, ]) firms make the maximum wage offer  i w ˆ = wS. At stage 
2, all firms choose (S, V, G).  
Under Strategy M, each of the m firms hires N/m individuals in period 1, because m ≥ m  implies 
N/m < D. Since N/m ≥  n* for all m (∈  [ m m, ]), the outcome of Strategy M is the MHI-
equilibrium. Clearly, the outcome of Strategy S is the SVG-equilibrium. 
In what follows, I will show that both Strategy M and Strategy S are SPNE strategies. 
Consider stage 2 subgames. c' < c implies that (S, V, G) is each firm’s optimal choice given other 
firms choose this. By the definition of n*, if n≥  n*, then (M, H, I) is each firm’s optimal choice 
given other firms choose this. Hence, both Strategy M and Strategy S constitute SPNE strategies 
of the stage 2 subgames. 
Next, consider firm i’s optimal wage offer at stage 1 given other (m-1) firms follow 
Strategy M where m (∈  [ m m, ]). Suppose that firm i chooses  i w ˆ = wM. Noting that c <  " ~ c (m +1) 
implies “π i[(S, rS, G), (M, H, I)] < π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] when n = N/(m + 1)”, firm i’s profit is 
zero since π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] = 0 when  i w ˆ = wM. Suppose firm i chooses  i w ˆ < wM. Then each 
of other firms hires min[N/(m-1), D] individuals. N/(m-1) < D holds for all m (∈  [ m m,] )  
because N/(m -1) < D. Then, other firms together hire all the N individuals. Hence firm i 
employs no individuals in period 1 and so its profit is zero. Suppose firm i chooses  i w ˆ > wM. 
Then firm i hires D individuals, and each of other firms hires (N-D)/(m-1)(> 0) individuals. If 
(N-D)/(m-1) ≥  n*, then all firms choose (M, H, I), and firm i’s profit is negative because  i w ˆ > 
wM. Suppose (N-D)/(m-1) < n*, then all firms choose (S, V, G). Note that the following holds for 
firm i. 
π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, I)] > π i[(S, V, G), (M, H, I)] > π i[(S, V, G), (S, V, G)], 
where the first inequality is implied by D > n*. The second inequality holds because, 
(2/n){π i[(S, V, G), (M, H, I)] – π i[(S, V, G), (S, V, G)]} 
≥  φ (S, V, G, H, I) – φ (S, V, G, V, G) 
= {1/[2x(G, G, 0)V(S)]}[x(G, G, 0)V(S) – (1/2)x(G, I, 1)H(S)]
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    – {1/[2x(G, G, 0)V(S)]}[x(G, G, 0)V(S) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)V(S)]
2 
> 0 (Note: x(G, G, 1) > x(G, I, 1) and V(S) > H(S)). 
Hence, firm i’s profit cannot exceed D{(1/2)[φ (M, H, I, H, I) + d] – cM –  i w ˆ }, which takes a 
negative value because  i w ˆ > wM. Then, firm i has no incentive to choose  i w ˆ > wM. Hence,  i w ˆ = 
wM  is its optimal wage offer. Through a similar logic, it can be shown that, given m (∈  [ m m,] )  
firms follow Strategy M, it is impossible for another firm to earn a positive profit. Therefore, 
Strategy M is an SPNE strategy of the entire game. Through a similar logic, it can be shown that 
Strategy S is also an SPNE strategy. 
  To show the existence of parameterizations for which c' < c'', I will show an example. Let 
x(I, I, 0) = 2.0, x(G, G, 1) = x(G, G, 0) = 1.5, x(I, G, 1) = 1.1, x(G, I, 1) = 0.8, x(I, I, 1) = 0.25, 
H(M) = 2.0, V(M) = 1.8, V(S) = 1.2, H(S) = 1.0, m = 4, D > N/3. Then c' ≈  0.454 < c'' ≈  0.484. 
  Now turn to welfare comparison. Suppose c' < c < c'' holds. Let WMHI (WSVG) denote 
total surplus in the MHI-equilibrium (SVG-equilibrium). Lemma 2 implies 
 W MHI = N(1/2)[φ (M, H, I, H, I) + d – c
M], 
 W SVG = N(1/2)[φ (S, V, G, V, G) + d – c
S]. 
Note that c < c'' implies 
 (1/2)φ (M, H, I, H, I) – c 
 >  (1/2)[φ (S, V, G, H, I) + m λ (V, G, M, H, I)] 
  ≥  (1/2)φ (S, V, G, H, I). 
Then, since φ (S, V, G, H, I) > φ (S, V, G, V, G) holds, we have  
(1/2)φ (M, H, I, H, I) – c > (1/2)φ (S, V, G, V, G), 
which implies WMHI > WSVG. 
  Finally, the labor turnover rate in the SVG-equilibrium is ã = x(G, G, 1)V(S)/(2x(G, G, 
0)V(S)) = 1/2, while the labor turnover rate in the MHI-equilibrium is ã = x(I, I, 1)H(M)/(2x(I, I, 






Proof of Lemma 3: 
Define π i[(ki, ri, ti), (K, R, T)] as in Lemma 2. It suffices to show (i) – (iv) below.  
(i) π i[(S, V, G)), (S, H, G)] > π i[(S, H, G), (S, H, G)] 
(ii) π i[(M, H, G), (M, V, G)] > π i[(M, V, G), (M, V, G)] 
(iii) π i[(M, H, I), (M, V, I)] > π i[(M, V, I), (M, V, I)] 
(iv) π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, G)] > π i[(M, H, G), (M, H, G)] 
(i) Since V(S) > H(S), we have,  
(2/n){π i[(S, V, G), (S, H, G)] – π i[(S, H, G), (S, H, G)]} 
≥  φ (S, V, G, H, G) – φ (S, H, G, H, G) 
> {1/[2x(G, G, 0)V(S)]}[x(G, G, 0)V(S) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)V(S)]
2 
  – {1/[2x(G, G, 0)H(S)]}[x(G, G, 0)H(S) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)H(S)]
2 
= [1/(2x(G, G, 0))][x(G, G, 0) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)]
2(V(S) – H(S)) > 0.  
Hence, π i[(S, V, G)), (S, H, G)] > π i[(S, H, G), (S, H, G)]. 
(ii) Since H(M) > V(M), we have 
(2/n){π i[(M, H, G), (M, V, G)] – π i[(M, V, G), (M, V, G)]} 
≥  φ (M, H, G, V, G) – φ (M, V, G, V, G) 
> {1/[2x(G, G, 0)H(M)]}[x(G, G, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)H(M)]
2 
  – {1/[2x(G, G, 0)V(M)]}[x(G, G, 0)V(M) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)V(M)]
2 
= [1/(2x(G, G, 0))][x(G, G, 0) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)]
2(H(M) – V(M)) > 0.  
Hence, π i[(M, H, G), (M, V, G)] > π i[(M, V, G), (M, V, G)]. 
(iii) Since H(M) > V(M), we have  
(2/n){π i[(M, H, I), (M, V, I)] – π i[(M, V, I), (M, V, I)]} 
≥  φ (M, H, I, V, I) – φ (M, V, I, V, I) 
> {1/[2x(I, I, 0)H(M)]}[x(I, I, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(I, I, 1)H(M)]
2 
  – {1/[2x(I, I, 0)V(M)]}[x(I, I, 0)V(M) – (1/2)x(I, I, 1)V(M)]
2 
= [1/(2x(I, I, 0))][x(I, I, 0) – (1/2)x(I, I, 1)]
2(H(M) – V(M)) > 0. 
Hence, π i[(M, H, I), (M, V, I)] > π i[(M, V, I), (M, V, I)]. 
(iv) Since x(I, I, 0) > x(I, G, 1) and x(I, I, 0) > x(G, G, 0) = x(G, G, 1), we have  
(2/n){π i[(M, H, I), (M, H, G)] – π i[(M, H, G), (M, H, G)]} 
≥  φ (M, H, I, H, G) – φ (M, H, G, H, G)  32
= {1/[2x(I, I, 0)H(M)]}[x(I, I, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(I, G, 1)H(M)]
2 
  – {1/[2x(G, G, 0)H(M)]}[x(G, G, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(G, G, 1)H(M)]
2 
> {1/[2x(I, I, 0)H(M)]}[x(I, I, 0)H(M) – (1/2)x(I, I, 0)H(M)]
2 – (1/8)x(G, G, 0)H(M) 
= (1/8)(x(I, I, 0) – x(G, G, 0))H(M) > 0. 




Proof of Proposition 2: 
(i)  Suppose c < c'. Then we have π i[(M, rM, tM), (S, V, G)] > π i[(S, V, G), (S, V, G)], which 
implies that the SVG-equilibrium does not exist. Since c < c'' holds, Strategy M is an SPNE 
strategy as in the proof of Proposition 1. 
(ii)  Suppose c > c''. Since c > c' holds, Strategy S is an SPNE strategy. c > c'' implies that the 
game does not have an MHI-equilibrium in which m (≥  m ) firms operate in period 1. Suppose 
that the game has an MHI-equilibrium in which m ˆ  firms operate in period 1. Then m ˆ <m  must 
hold, which implies N/(m ˆ -1) > D. A strategy that supports the MHI-equilibrium must include 
‘m ˆ firms make the highest period 1 wage offer wM and hire N/m ˆ  individuals at stage 1, and 
choose (M, H, I) at stage 2.’ Suppose all firms except firm 1 follow the strategy. Since N/(m ˆ -1) 
> D holds, firm 1 can earn positive profit by offering a first period wage less than wM and hiring 
a positive measure of individuals. Hence, the MHI-equilibrium cannot exist.   Q.E.D. 
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